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時 間:2019年3月14日(周四) 10:00-11:30

地 點:復旦大學管理學院史帶樓303室

主 題:Multimarket contact under imperfect monitoring

主講人:鄭兵勇 副教授(上海財經大學)

主持人:姚志勇 副教授

摘 要: Existing theoretical researches on multimarket contact provided only a partial support to the “mutual forbearance” hypothesis. This paper considers a multimarket contact model with symmetric markets and imperfect monitoring. When the probability of punishment is conditioned upon outcomes from several markets, we show that multimarket contact fosters collusion in two aspects. First, pooling information from two or more market reduces the likelihood of retaliation resulted from observation error and increases the expected payoffs from collusion, which makes collusion more attractable. Second, and more important, the ability to strategically link retaliation across markets lowers the threshold discount factors for collusive
agreement to be self-enforcing between rival firms. Our result therefore suggests that market symmetry or inability to observe rival firms’ past actions should not be taken as evidence that engaging in multiple markets is not conducive to collusive behavior.

鄭兵勇,加拿大西安大略大學經濟學博士,上海財經大學經濟學院常任副教授,研究領域包括微觀經濟理論、重復博弈論,論文發表于Rand Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior等國際學術期刊。